Donate Now. Northeastern Illinois University North St. Louis Avenue Chicago, Illinois The decision to topple Mossadegh emerged from several factors. Such comments have led historians to speculate that the Eisenhower administration, which enjoyed close ties to the American oil industry, sought to remove Mossadegh in order to gain access to Iranian oil and protect Western oil interests elsewhere.
Fear of collapse stemming from a prolonged oil shutdown and a lack of oil revenues for the Iranian state outweighed worries of a global oil economy without Iran. The precise imagining of this collapse was linked to the threat of the Tudeh Party. Reports at the time indicated that the communist group was not ready to challenge the government. As one Iranian minister explained to the U. But this threat was never characterized at the time as imminent.
Documents in the Foreign Relations of the United States volume and other declassified sources indicate that avoiding a Kashani government was as important to U. Worries that Mossadegh would die or resign once again prompted concerns over who would succeed him — something that had preoccupied the Truman administration. With conservative opposition too weak to mount an effective opposition effort, Mossadegh would be succeeded by another member of the National Front.
Ayatollah Kashani was the most likely candidate, given his prominence, popular following, and powerful street presence. As prime minister, it was unlikely Kashani would seek an oil agreement. Avoiding this outcome was another reason the United States opted for covert action. Instead, both oil and communism factored into the decision through the predictive analytical framework of the collapse narrative represented in the reports and writings of Carr, Henderson, Thornburg, and Allen Dulles: They describe the deterioration of the oil-less economy, the consequent increase in communist or extremist influence, and the final nightmare scenario in which Iran could break away from the West, become a Soviet satellite, and threaten Western access to all Middle East oil.
And yet, no one in either the Truman or Eisenhower administration articulated what collapse would look like in completely lucid terms. Hence, its characterization as a narrative: a story of how the future in Iran might unfold, should the United States do nothing. Once the narrative came to dominate policy, a form of groupthink took over. Dulles must have either ignored the report or had it suppressed. Such aid would keep the post-coup government on its feet while also giving the U.
Fazlallah Zahidi, a former general, was selected to lead the post-coup government. Henderson, who had gone out of his way to aid the monarchy in February , suggested the shah could be replaced if he proved uncooperative. As per the U. Intercorporate documents gleaned from the archive of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company later BP make it clear that the companies had no need of Iranian oil, as the global market was in a state of over-supply and an Iranian recovery would depress prices.
The American oil companies initially argued that it would be better for the British to return to Iran alone, permitting the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to recover its nationalized assets. But John Foster Dulles and others rejected this as politically impossible. Even with Mossadegh out of power, the Iranian public would react violently to a British return, unless it was suitably camouflaged.
The Eisenhower administration directed the five major U. But the reality of nationalization was effectively reversed, and the Western oil companies would control the flow of Iranian oil for another 20 years. For American policymakers, however, these issues were of secondary importance. The coup was complete. The collapse narrative formed by Carr, Henderson, Dulles, and Thornburg carried over into the official histories of the coup.
The collapse narrative provided the foundation for the decision to remove Mossadegh. Fears of a collapse had percolated throughout the policymaking apparatus for months and were evident in the economic reports of Carr and the political analysis of Henderson.
CIA Director Dulles was a crucial supporter of intervention, but while he may have accepted the collapse narrative, he did not form it entirely on his own. Although covert action was initially rejected, by March other options — aiding Mossadegh, pushing for an oil settlement, or doing nothing — appeared unsuitable.
Once the coup decision was made, there was no going back. But all that lay in the future. There was an obvious sense of relief among U.
A historian of U. Find him gbrew Acknowledgements : This article is based on a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. The author would like to thank the panel participants who read and commented on the paper, including Mary Ann Heiss, Mark J.
The author would also like to acknowledge the excellent editorial assistance of the staff at the Texas National Security Review and both peer-review readers. For general studies of the crisis that precipitated the August coup, see, James A.
Bill and Wm. Roger Louis, eds. His visit was covered widely in newspapers, magazines, television, and theatrical newsreels. He asked for U. This did not materialize, and he left empty-handed after nearly six weeks in the United States.
In June , Mossadegh traveled to The Hague, Netherlands and presented nearly documents to the International Court regarding the highly exploitative nature of the AIOC and the extent of its political intervention into the Iranian political system. Back in Iran, economic and security conditions were deteriorating rapidly, worsened by increasing subversive activities of foreign powers and their agents.
In a July meeting with the young monarch Mohammad Reza Shah , who headed the military, Mossadegh requested control of the armed forces but was refused. In response, Mossadegh immediately submitted his resignation as Prime Minister. Ghavam took a hard line, further angering the people who had come out to the streets in support of Mossadegh. In the largest street protest on July 20, 30 Tir, security forces clashed violently with the demonstrators, resulting in hundreds of casualties.
On the same day the International Court at The Hague voted in favor of Iran, holding that it had no jurisdiction in the oil dispute case.
This was soon followed by the U. Security Council rejection of the British complaint against Iran. Mossadegh was at the height of his power and popularity, hailed as a hero not only in Iran, but in the greater Middle East. He implemented many social reforms and fought for the rights of women, workers, and peasants.
A fund was created to pay for rural development projects and give assistance to farmers. According to his policy of negative equilibrium , an idea that helped the formation of the non-allied nations, Mossadegh also refused to grant an oil concession to the Soviet Union.
Most importantly, Mossadegh helped to foster a national self-sufficiency that remains unduplicated in Iran since his tenure: balancing the budget, increasing non-oil productions and creating a trade balance. His policies were frequently opposed by the Shah, army generals, leading clerics, land owners, the Tudeh Communist party , and the governments of Britain and America.
Nevertheless, Mossadegh could always rely upon the support of the people. Working jointly with the American CIA, they plotted a coup to overthrow his democratically elected government. Suggested reading. In the former Yugoslavia, tourism is reigniting an interest in the concrete legacies of the anti-fascism struggle. Most popular articles Labour. One year after the protests, workers in Belarus are still pushing for democracy and labour rights - Equal Times Newsdesk. Human rights. Turkey takes a step backwards on violence against women - Marga Zambrana.
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